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Abstract
THEA is a technique designed to help anticipate human-computer interaction failures. It has been developed
within the Dependable Computing Systems Centre (DCSC) at York for use by systems engineers. Human factors
knowledge is not necessary for the application of the method. It is intended for use early in the development
lifecycle as design concepts and requirements concerned with safety, usability and functionality are emerging.
The technique employs an embedded cognitive error analysis based on Norman’s model of human information
processing and does not presuppose any formal knowledge of human factors or cognitive psychology on its users.
This report is based upon, and updates, a previous University of York Technical report (YCS294)  (Fields et al.,
1997).
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4Executive Summary
Operators working within technologically sophisticated safety-critical domains such as nuclear power production,
aviation and medicine, interface with systems possessing intricate defences to reduce the likelihood of accidents.
Notwithstanding this, accidents and incidents continue to occur. To identify ways in which interfaces may be
vulnerable to erroneous operator action, a descriptive error analysis, as distinct from more ‘traditional’
quantitative human reliability analysis (HRA) approaches, can be valuable in clarifying how the design needs to
change. THEA is one such descriptive technique supporting iterative analysis and design of dependable
interactive systems.
An important reason for the development of THEA is that the technique may be carried out by system engineers
who are likely to possess only a limited grounding in human factors. The method is designed to inform human-
computer interface design at an early stage of development, perhaps as part of concept evaluation and review, or
assessing a design prototype.
It is worth mentioning that it is not the aim of this report to support the process of making quantitative estimates
of the likelihood of interaction failure. Rather, the aim is to help designers reason about errors early in the design
lifecycle of the interactive system, and to take account of such reasoning while the design is still flexible enough
to be modified without excessive time and expense. One concern is to establish how work is actually practiced
rather than the way it is envisaged as being carried out.
Users and intended audience
The primary users of this document, and of the technique it describes, are intended to be systems engineers
involved from the early stages in the design lifecycle of products possessing substantial interactive components.
No particular grounding in human factors, cognitive engineering or psychology is assumed, although occasional
assistance from human factors personnel may be appropriate for specific difficulties that may be encountered. Of
prime importance is an understanding of the domain and context in which a new system is to be fielded. Indeed,
the technique can be seen as affording designers and engineers a highly structured means of applying their
domain expertise to assessing user interface designs from a human factors point of view.
Structure of the report
The first part of this document describes the THEA technique including its underlying composition around a
model of human information processing. The physical and environmental setting of the proposed system is
detailed through use of scenarios, as well as the tasks that humans will be required to carry out in such scenarios.
This information forms the principal input to a questionnaire-based error analysis (EA), and affords designers the
ability to anticipate areas of potential interaction failure of the system being assessed.
The second part of the report describes a case study from the aviation domain and also provides a fully worked
example of the THEA technique applied to a less complex domain involving the programming of a domestic
video recorder. It is intended that this will demonstrate clearly how the technique may be applied to individual,
more complex, projects.
Finally, we briefly describe “ProtoTHEA”, a prototype software tool to assist with THEA analyses.
51 The human error assessment process
1.1 Introduction
Testing a design for usability is playing an increasingly important role in system development as human-
computer interaction becomes more sophisticated. An approach, known as ‘empirical usability testing’, aims to
improve the usability of a product through observing real users performing real tasks. The data is analysed and
problems diagnosed so that changes may be incorporated to fix them. While comprehensive, such an approach is
costly in terms of time and money. It takes place late in the design process, and requires at least a working
prototype. In response to such concerns, methods taking account of human mental processes, based on underlying
models of human cognition, have been devised that can be carried out with early versions of the design without
representative users. THEA is one such method, aimed at establishing requirements on a design to afford a more
error resilient system design. It has its roots in human reliability assessment (HRA) methods (Kirwan, 1994), but
unlike these, it is specifically designed to inform human-computer interface design at an early stage of
development. The need for prior human factors experience or familiarity with cognitive psychology is not
required since the method possesses a cognitive model (discussed in Section 6) embedded within the error
analysis questionnaire (Section 7). It is a suggestive technique, guiding the analyst in a structured manner to
consider areas of a design for potential interaction difficulties.
1.2 The THEA process
The main components of the THEA process are illustrated in Figure 1, and include:
· Understanding the device being designed (Box 1)
- System description: A specification of relevant aspects of the new system’s functionality and interface,
and how it interacts with other systems in the application domain.
· Understanding the work for which a system will be used (Box 2)
- Scenario description: Taking representative examples of the use of the system as a basis for establishing
requirements for the new design, particularly those requirements that relate to human error
vulnerabilities;
- Task description: A representation of the work that the operator(s) are intended to do in terms of goals,
plans and actions.
· Goal decomposition (Box 3)
- Task analysis: To structure and interpret information contained in scenarios, hierarchical task analysis
(HTA) is a practical, but by no means the only, way of achieving goal decomposition. We describe an
operator’s tasks in terms of the goals and sub-goals that the person is trying to achieve and the actions
used to achieve them.
· Understanding how errors can arise (Boxes 4 & 5)
- Error analysis (EA): The identification and explanation of human erroneous action that may arise in the
operation of the system, possibly as a result of the way it is designed. The EA poses questions about the
scenario to reveal areas of design where cognitive failures may occur, and to assess their possible impact
on the task or system being controlled.
- Model of human cognition – A number of models, theories and collections of empirical data about
human performance and human error exist and can be useful in deciding which scenarios will be
important to examine, and how participants will act in a given scenario. In this document we make use
of a particular model known as the “execution-evaluation” model of human information processing
(Norman, 1988). This can be used to help understand some of the causal factors which can lead to error.
· Designing for error (Box 6)
- Impact analysis and design iteration: assessment of the likelihood of the human erroneous action and
the implications for design.
6Figure 1 - The THEA process
Embodied in THEA is the view that it is context, or the circumstances in which actions are performed, which is a
primary determinant of human performance. Scenario actions are surrounded by contextual factors that allow
those actions to happen and provide opportunities for human error. THEA analyses capture through detailed
scenarios the conditions that may result in unanticipated and unintended interactions. Knowing how a device
functions in a scenario provides a systematic and structured means of critiquing a design and developing further
requirements.
The backwards pointing arrow in Figure 1 illustrates that the THEA process is intended to be applied iteratively
to refine the design specification or work description. New designs are infrequently created from scratch but are
most likely to be modifications or re-designs of some existing product. In such situations, understanding the
differences between the old and new versions is usually highly informative. The next section discusses briefly
why this is so.
1.3 Historical information and operational experience
When a new system is a re-design of an existing system, there will often be historical information in existence
about how the old system performed, how it was used in practice, what the good and bad features of the old
technology were, and so on. Even if the new system has been designed from scratch, there will frequently be
plenty of historical data on the past use of similar systems, or systems performing a similar function. Some of the
important sources for such data include:
· Prescriptions of how the system should be used, in the form of instructions, manuals, standard operating
procedures, training material, task analyses, and so on;
· Descriptions of particular problems and incidents that took place. In safety critical areas such as aviation,
these are often formally collected and published as, for example, aircraft accident investigations;
· Accounts provided by practitioners, designers, and other stakeholders of how they carry out their work using
existing systems. This includes where the problem areas and weak points are, what situations and
circumstances are particularly challenging, and how changes in technology might cause new problems or
alleviate old ones.
2 Scenarios
One of the most important antecedents of the error analysis process is to develop an understanding of how the
technological system or sub-system being designed will be used in practice. To achieve this, it is recommended
that scenarios are identified and collected that represent the use of a system in context (Kyng, 1995). Scenarios
are often used in industry as a means of assessing the consequences and possibilities of a design. For example, in
the military, ‘forcing missions’ are chosen, based on criteria concerned with mission effectiveness of a system.
Judgements are then made concerning the difficulty of achieving mission goals. The basic claim of the scenario-
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7based approach to development is that the design process should take the specific and concrete, rather than the
general and abstract as its primary input. The justification for this view is that concrete examples allow
practitioners to envisage and articulate how they would behave in a given situation more effectively. This allows
designers to envisage how their design may be used.
In the THEA approach, we are more concerned with choosing usage scenarios which highlight how a design
creates opportunities for error, thereby impacting dependability.
2.1 How to structure a scenario
The purpose of using scenarios in design is to provide designers and analysts with a way of capturing how a
proposed design will be used. A description of a scenario must cover not only the actions that take place in a
given situation, but also the contextual factors that surround the action, allow it to happen, and afford
opportunities for ‘error’. The aspects of context that should be recorded in a scenario description are as follows:
- The physical environment and situation in which participants find themselves;
- The task context;
- The system context.
A template for describing scenarios is shown in Table 1. Generic completion information is shown in each cell,
but naturally in a blank template, only the row headings will be displayed, with space beneath for recording
analyst information.
Table 1 - A template for describing scenarios
AGENTS
- The human agents involved and their organisation
- The roles played by the humans, together with their goals and responsibilities
RATIONALE
- Why is this scenario an interesting or useful one to have picked?
SITUATION AND ENVIRONMENT
- The physical situation in which the scenario takes place
- External and environmental triggers, problems and events that occur in this scenario
TASK CONTEXT
- What tasks are carried out?
- What formal procedures exist, and will they be followed as prescribed?
SYSTEM CONTEXT
- What devices and technology are involved?
- What usability problems might participants have?
- What effects can users have?
ACTION
- How are the tasks carried out in context?
- How do the activities overlap?
- Which goals do actions correspond to?
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
- How might the scenario evolve differently, either as a result of uncertainty in the
environment or because of variations in agents, situation, design options, system and task
context?
ASSUMPTIONS
- What, if any, assumptions have been made that will affect this scenario?
2.2 Where do scenarios come from?
To identify situations that may be significant, we make use of the following information sources:
§ The stories and experiences of practitioners (pilots, operators, other crew members i.e. the users) and other
domain experts (designers, human factors experts, maintenance or training personnel, etc.). Some developers
recruit experts who have extensive experience of earlier versions of the system;
8§ Historical reports about problems experienced, incidents, likely events;
§ Frequent conditions and normal operation. This could be based on expert judgement or usage logs of an
existing system;
§ Changes in technology, organisation, function allocation etc. from a previous or existing system. Here,
scenarios will focus on changes in the system, such as changing from a three- to two-man crew on an aircraft
flight deck. In this example, an appropriate scenario might be where the tasks of the now obsolete third crew
member (i.e., the flight engineer) are particularly tested and place new requirements on the remaining crew;
§ Situations that are independent of technology and systems support, taking a problem-driven approach and
focusing on situations that will arise whatever technological support is provided to practitioners. For
example, a move from voice-based communications in air traffic control (ATC) to digital data-linking may
evoke scenarios which focus on complex and difficult air traffic conditions whatever control regime and
supporting technology is in-situ.
2.3 Have sufficient scenarios been collected?
The question often arises as to how many scenarios are required to capture the usage context in sufficient detail.
Has a “good enough” coverage been obtained, so that when the system is fielded, the most important
requirements can be confidently ascertained? The answer really relies on expert domain judgement. If domain
experts are not the people performing the analysis, it will be desirable to have at least one domain expert
involved in the scenario construction process.
2.4 Example scenario
We present in this report a case study regarding an emerging design, and concentrate on one snapshot of this
design and hypothesise about how it will be used. Historical records of system operation could not be relied on
here, so this scenario was used as a way of eliciting from experts how they think the scenario might unfold, and
where they think problems might occur.
The scenario takes place on the flight deck of a reconnaissance aircraft which is monitoring fishing vessel
activities, and flown by a two-person crew. The flight deck previously had a third crew member, the flight
engineer, but who has now been replaced by automation. This scenario is important as it involves activities in
which, in the old system, the flight engineer was heavily involved. Table 2 provides an overview of the scenario.
Table 2 - Overview of flight deck bird-strike scenario
AGENTS
The proposed design will be flown by two flight deck crew (in contrast to the three currently
present). The primary job of these two pilots is to fly the aircraft safely to their destination.
RATIONALE
This scenario is important as it involves activities in which, under the old system, the flight
engineer was heavily involved. This will be a good test of whether the new technology can be
an effective replacement for the knowledge and skills of the FE and the “spare cognitive
capacity” available on a three-person flight deck.
SITUATION AND ENVIRONMENT
The starting conditions for the scenario are an aircraft flying at low level over water (200ft,
during daytime) photographing a fishing vessel. To conserve fuel, the aircraft is flying on three
of the four engines (2,3,4).
The aircraft suffers a massive bird strike on the right side which has two engines running (3,4).
As a result of bird ingestion, both these engines fail, producing engine failure and engine fire
warnings. The engine problems will cause the failure of the generators in these engines which
will in turn lead to the remaining generators being overloaded. This will result in a series of
warnings or cautions being signalled after a short delay.
TASK CONTEXT
The crew must take immediate action in order to keep the aircraft flying, before commencing
the drills in response to the engine fire/failure and any secondary warnings that occur. The
immediate priority response sequence to keep the aircraft airborne is power, drag, trim, and
engine re-start.
9The pilot will attempt to gain altitude, although a single engine may not be sufficient to climb or
maintain the current altitude – hence the importance of restarting the number 1 (left-most)
engine. After completing these actions, the crew must perform the engine fire and failure drills.
Both consist of a combination of immediate actions and subsequent actions. Typically, the
immediate actions for all the current warnings will be carried out before proceeding to any of
the subsequent actions.
SYSTEM CONTEXT
The procedures above will be available on the electronic procedures format of the lower
electronic centralised aircraft monitoring (ECAM) display. Additionally, these are written on
flight reference cards and also, presumably, in the pilots’ memory.
ACTION
The pilots’ actions are overt, physical acts (mostly inputs or communications) carried out by
one or other pilot. See Section 5 for a detailed description and explanations.
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
There are a number of possible variations in this scenario, including:
§ Failure of hydraulics pumps (additional crew tasks arising from secondary failures);
§ Additional navigation tasks (if bird strike close to land, the additional burden on the crew
to navigate safely away from the area becomes more critical and complex);
§ Unsuccessful fire drill (extinguishers may not be adequate to put fire out; engine 1 may not
restart; aircraft may be heavy and unable to climb. Question of ditching aircraft becomes a
consideration requiring a completely different set of tasks be carried out).
ASSUMPTIONS
No specific assumptions have been made. For simplicity, the ‘exceptional circumstances’ are
not considered.
3 Understanding TASK Context
We mentioned previously that tasks and task knowledge play a pivotal role in the ongoing activity. In this section
we discuss in greater detail how tasks may be described. HCI literature describes many methods of analysing
tasks, each with associated strengths and weaknesses. The error analysis process does not mandate the use of any
specific task analysis method, nor is any specific notation required for describing tasks. If an analyst or engineer
applying THEA is familiar with a particular technique, or a task analysis has already been carried out as part of
the project, then it makes sense to re-use as much work and expertise as possible. Nevertheless, a number of
features of any task description are desirable:
§ Work is described in terms of the agents and roles that are responsible for carrying it out;
§ Associated with each role are the goals for which that role is responsible;
§ Goals may be decomposed into lower-level sub-goals and actions;
§ Constraints on the order in which sub-goals and actions should be carried out are described by a plan;
§ The performance of tasks is triggered by events, produced in the environment or the result of some internal
cognitive process.
A technique which possesses such characteristics is Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) (Kirwan, 1994), and is
described in the next section. If, however, the interaction under examination is relatively straightforward, it may
only be necessary to write down the goals each operator will be engaged in, together with the actions required to
achieve each goal. In such situations, the unnecessary hierarchical complexity of employing an HTA can be
avoided.
3.1 Hierarchical goal decomposition
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is a technique that can be used to describe an operator’s tasks in terms of the
goals and sub-goals that the person is trying to achieve and the actions used to achieve them. It is hierarchical
because task goals are broken down into a structure of sub-goals that have to be achieved in order that the top-
level goal is satisfied. A simplified example in Figure 2 is based on the bird strike scenario described in Table 2:
10
Figure 2 - Example of a simple hierarchical task analysis (HTA)
If necessary, the lowest level sub-goals may themselves be decomposed into smaller sub-goals, depending on the
level of detail required.
3.2 When to stop hierarchical decomposition
One of the problems with carrying out an HTA is deciding at what level of detail to stop the hierarchical
decomposition. In general, there is no single answer to this question because it depends on the purpose of the
HTA. If the purpose is to consider training needs, then analysis might well stop at a higher level than if the
purpose is to consider what displays and controls an operator might need. Ultimately, a complete analysis may
well need to decompose the task to the level of individual operator actions.
However, we argue that the analysis process is an iterative one and that it can, and should, commence with fairly
high-level goals associated with the task. The particulars of a task will determine whether, once this high-level
analysis is complete, there is a need to pursue all nodes in the hierarchy down to individual actions. With
experience, it is usually apparent when the necessary level of decomposition has been achieved. An incidental
benefit encountered in practice has been the occasional need to insert previously unconsidered nodes or sub-
nodes (and sometimes node removal) as a result of completing, or working through, the error analysis
questionnaire.
3.3 Plans
A goal decomposition describes how a problem can be broken down into simpler sub-problems. What they do not
describe, however, is when the sub-problems must be addressed and in what order. Clearly it is possible to carry
out some sub-problems in one order only (for example, a pilot receiving clearance from air traffic control cannot
be confirmed until it has been received), but in some instances, the order substantially affects the final outcome
(such as making a change to the flight path without having received clearance). Given the importance of sequence
and ordering, it is useful to introduce a special plan description to capture this information. In Figure 2, this is the
text between the hierarchical levels (‘Perform simultaneously’, ‘In order’, etc.). The description makes the
ordering sequence explicit and it is also possible to specify conditional goals such as ‘if…then’. In this way it is
possible to include statements about what to do if a particular goal is not achieved (such as if air traffic clearance
is refused). Plans therefore describe the flow of control through the task and document how the sub-goals and
actions of a task are combined to satisfy the higher-level goal. Plans can also be used to specify the triggering
conditions under which certain optional sub-goals can be initiated, which may be failure conditions of either the
system or the operator. If plan and goal descriptions have been carried out correctly, every goal mentioned in the
goal description should also be mentioned in the plan, and vice versa. Additionally, any restrictions on the order
in which the goals can be achieved should be mentioned in the plan. These two features are useful for validating
the task analysis structure.
A useful notation for describing plans is shown in Table 3.
[Root goal]
Maintain safe
flight
2.
Maintain power
to essential
systems
1.
Maintain
airframe
integrity
3.
Maintain and
gain altitude
1.1
Shut down
Engine 3
1.2
Shut down
Engine 4
2.1 Resolve
generator
overload
3.1
Increase power
3.2
Reduce drag
Plan: Perform simultaneously
Plan: In order Plan: Perform simultaneously
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Table 3 - A notation for describing plans
Conditional: If <condition> then <plan>
Triggering: <condition> triggers <plan>
Sequence: <plan> ; <plan>
Parallel <plan> || <plan>
Any order <plan>, <plan> in any order
Repetition: Repeat <plan> until <condition>
4 Understanding SYSTEM context
When we refer to some aspect of the technology under scrutiny about which we may have particular concerns, we
are actually referring to the context of use of that technology. To assess such context, it is highly desirable to
ascertain:
§ what devices and technology are involved,
§ what usability problems might they present to users, and
§ what effects can users have on the technology.
A particular area of concern regarding usability often cited as a particular problem and a causal factor in many
accidents and incidents, is that of moding or, more specifically, “mode error”. THEA addresses moding issues as
part of the error analysis (see the error analysis template in Appendix B – Blank error analysis template,
questions A3+I8 explicitly, and also A2/I3), specifically to minimise potential for mode errors. The next section
explores moding in greater detail.
Appendix D – Non-scenario-based evaluation approaches. This briefly discusses some alternative issues that
should be considered during interface design. Combined with an error model and a particular usage scenario,
these can also assist with revealing potential errors in a new design. The aim is not to provide a detailed
presentation of formalised techniques for analysing interfaces, but rather to help raise important design questions.
These may be answered from experience and intuition, especially when the interface is not especially complex.
Many other techniques exist and are discussed extensively in the literature (see, for example (Dix et al., 1998)).
4.1 What is a mode?
When using the term ‘mode’, we refer to a system configuration that defines how it interprets user input, or how
its output should be construed by the user1. If a system behaves in different ways (either because actions have
different effects or because outputs mean different things) at different times, then we say that the system can be in
one of a number of modes at different times. Transitions between modes – and therefore between configurations
of behaviour – can be caused either by user actions, or autonomously by the system itself.
Consider a manual data entry panel in an aircraft cockpit. The panel is designed to support a number of different
data entry tasks, allowing the pilot to enter different types of information to several aircraft systems. Since the
physical space available for this device is limited, all its functionality cannot be made available at once, and a
number of modes are provided for carrying out the different tasks. A "Comms.” mode exists for entering
communications data: the numeric keys and the display are used to enter and present radio frequencies. Similarly,
a “Nav.” mode exists for manipulating navigational data such as waypoints and headings. A number of buttons
allow the current mode of the device to be changed.
The moding structure of a system can be made more opaque by the fact that modes can be decomposed into sub-
modes. A simple example of this is where a “system” contains two or more moded devices. The mode of the
whole system can be thought of as the composite of the modes of its sub-parts. However, even a single device can
exist in several modes concurrently. For example, a process control system can have a “training mode” and an
“operational mode”. Additionally, it may have “safe” and “emergency” modes. The whole system can be thought
of as a composite mode e.g. “training” + “safe” mode. The potential therefore exists for what is known as mode
ambiguity where certain user actions can have different effects on the system depending on its current state. This
                                                          
1 ‘Mode’ is also used by systems engineers to describe “internal” behavioural configurations of a system or
external states of the environment. Our more ‘user-centred’ definition is similar, but it is important to note that
user interface modes need not be co-incident with internal system modes.
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can be compounded by inappropriate mode feedback and ultimately a state of mode confusion can exist within
the user. Once an operator is confused about the mode a system is in, this can lead to the commitment of mode
error from the system’s point of view. From a user’s point of view, this leads to situations where the automated
systems act in some way ‘outside the expectations of their human supervisors’ (Woods et al., 1994). This
discrepancy between a user’s expectation and the systems acting might be due to a lack of mode awareness.
Figure 3, based on (Loer et al., 1999) illustrates one representation of these different aspects of moding together
with their interrelationships. This is followed by a brief explanation of the terms presented.
Figure 3 - Moding issues from a system and human perspective
§ Coordination breakdown between co-operative agents:
A coordination breakdown between these agents is regarded as equivalent to the system-centred view of
mode error and the human-centred view of automation surprises.
§ Expectation
Includes both the user’s expectation based on the history, experience and perceived system output
(visual, tactile, and so on), as well as the system’s ‘expectation’ based on the interpretation of sensory
inputs and program code.
§ Attentional dynamics
Attentional drifting and being side-tracked (for example, being required to deal with a higher priority
task during execution of regular duties e.g. checklists). Can lead to missed mode transitions or a failure
to appreciate the significance of a transition.
§ Stereotypical methods
Use of the same methods based on experience of dealing with frequently recurring situations. In non-
standard conditions there is an increased likelihood of performing the often-performed action(s), which
in this situation constitutes erroneous action as a result of the standardised mental model.
§ Mode complexity
Mode redundancy Mode coupling Low perceivability
of mode status &
transitions
Large number of
modes
Low operational
visibility
MODE
COMPLEXITY
Stereotypical methods
& strategies in
frequently occurring
situations
Non-awareness of
current mode
configuration
Gaps/
misconceptions in
users' mental
model
Expectation
Misassessment of
mode
configuration
Failure to notice/
predict mode
transition status
over time
Attentional
dynamics
problems
"Mode Complexity"
"Mode Confusion"
"Mode Error" / "Automation
Surprise"
Glossary:
"can contribute to"
concerns user
concerns system
Coordination
breakdown
between
cooperating
agents
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A mode structure that is difficult to comprehend.
§ Mode redundancy
Different combinations of modes can have the same effect.
§ Mode coupling
Interdependencies of modes exist within the same, or between different, systems or sub-systems.
4.2 Assessing moding problem causality
Figure 3 helps determine possible causes of potential moding problems that may be identified in a THEA error
analysis. Such causes have important implications for the construction of system requirements. An example may
serve to clarify this.
Consider one of the questionnaire’s moding questions  ‘A3’: “Is the correct action dependent on the current
mode?”  In other words, is the technology being used required to be in a particular mode before a user is able to
perform the action correctly? If so, there is a chance that the mode currently selected may be the inappropriate
one for the task in hand. An unintended system response, possibly with an undesired consequence, may occur as a
result. For example, when trying to set the time on a domestic clock radio, one may inadvertently de-tune the
previously set frequency. The same ‘up/down’ buttons are used to set both the time and frequency, but setting the
time requires an additional action (pressing a separate button) to be performed while operating the ‘up/down’
keys. In other words, the unit must be in the clock ‘mode’.
Figure 3 can help determine possible causes for incorrect operation, and might lead us to examine areas of the
design where re-appraisal may be needed. In our simple example, a user failing to press the clock mode button is
either unaware of the unit’s current mode configuration, or unaware that an additional separate action needs to be
performed in order to change the time digits on the display. How might this arise?
The two relevant boxes on the diagram are “Non-awareness of current mode configuration” and
“Gaps/misconceptions in users’ mental model” (larger of the two shaded regions, top row). From the arrows
leading in to each box, we can see that possible causes for the user’s incorrect action may result from ‘mode
complexity’ (see arrows leading into this box for possible causes), low visibility of the button, or perhaps because
the present mode is enunciated poorly or not at all. The latter two seem the most probable. Another possibility,
‘Attentional dynamics problems’ (and therefore its causal factors), can be discounted here as this is very unlikely.
By following plausible pathways in the diagram, potential causes can be ascertained, permitting further questions
to be asked of the design. In such a way, solutions may be found, and the design modified appropriately.
5 Understanding actions in context
We have seen that one of the principal components of a scenario is a description of the actions which take place.
The scenario discussed in Section 2.4 involves actions performed by each agent (the two pilots and the “system”)
and is illustrated in Table 4, listing the actions and events taking place in the early part of the scenario, with time
increasing in a downwards direction:
Table 4 - A timeline showing individual crew and system actions
System status Pilot Co-Pilot Info sources System
response
Engine 3 fire warning
Engine 4
failure warning
Throttle 2 max.
Press master warning
Throttle 1 idle
Throttle 1 max.
Navigate safe exit route
Close ext. doors
Flaps 0
Rudder trim
Warn crew
Throttle 3 close
Engine 3 LP cock shut
Engine 3 fire ext: shot 1
Airmanship
Airmanship
Engine 3 fire drill
Select ‘ENG
ECAM’ page
Start engine
Time
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Table 4 illustrates the actions performed by each agent (the two pilots and the ‘system’) and also provides a place
for describing what information will be used by the pilots to take the actions they do. What this tabular
presentation also begins to highlight is the fact that the two pilots are performing possibly contradictory tasks at
the same time. For example, the pilot is attempting to restart engine 1 to obtain more thrust, while the co-pilot is
performing actions to close down the damaged engines (3 and 4) which will reduce overall thrust.
However, what the table does not show are links between actions (opening and closing throttles) and the
surrounding context i.e. the goals to which the actions are directed, which was one of the reasons for constructing
scenarios in the first place. To address this deficiency, we might modify Table 4 to take account of the task
ordering and the goals to which they are directed, as derived from the task analysis. The result is shown in Figure
4.
Figure 4 - Alternative hierarchical goal structuring diagram of bird-strike scenario
Presenting actions in this manner highlights a number of scenario features not immediately apparent in previous
representations. In particular, it shows which goals and tasks become active, and are active concurrently in the
scenario (not present in a simple task analysis such as Figure 2), and which actions are related by being directed
towards the same goals (not present in a simple event listing such as Table 4 which makes no mention of goals).
6 Understanding erroneous operator actions
The error identification process discussed in the latter part of this report is based on two views of how human
behaviour may be described, and forms part of the error model. On the one hand, we can assume that a user’s
actions arise as emergent behaviour of a cognitive system comprising the user’s internal cognitive processes, the
objects of the user’s work, interactive systems, and other human agents. Alternatively, human behaviour may be
described simply in terms of the physical (and possibly cognitive) actions that are observed or assumed to take
place without much regard to the processes and mechanisms by which the actions are generated.
Both views have their place in error analysis, and lead to different views of the nature of error. In fact we shall
use the two techniques in conjunction.
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Figure 5 - Norman's “Execution-
Evaluation” model of human information
processing
6.1 Cognitive failure
Errors can be regarded as failures in
cognitive processing. Figure 5 shows a
model of human information processing
(Norman, 1988). This illustrates that
human action has two aspects –
execution and evaluation. The stages of
execution start at the top with the goal
i.e. the state that is to be achieved2. The
goal is translated into an intention to do
some action which must be translated
into a set of internal commands, an
action sequence, that can be performed
to satisfy the intention. However,
nothing happens until it is executed, and performed on ‘the world’. Evaluation commences  with our perception
of ‘the world’, which must be interpreted according to our expectations and then evaluated with respect to both
our intentions and our goals. Using this model, we can identify a number of cognitive failures, or ways in which
human information processing can fail, which have the potential for leading to erroneous behaviour.
Figure 6 - Sources of cognitive failure based on
Norman's model and the THEA error analysis
questionnaire
Failures in human information processing
include:
§ Failures in the triggering and activation
of goals (goals not triggered at the right
time, the wrong goal being activated, or
goals being lost);
§ Failures in the goals themselves (goals
not achievable in the current conditions, or
sets of conflicting goals);
§ Faulty plans (plans that fail to achieve the
goal or whose execution is impossible);
§ Failures to execute actions adequately
(e.g. ‘slips’ or ‘lapses’, where an action is
missed or carried out incorrectly);
§ Perceptual failures (failure to see what the
effect of an action is, or failure to notice
some external event or condition);
§ Failures of interpretation and evaluation
of perceptions (incorrect interpretation or
perceived data, failure to realise when a
goal has been completed).
Figure 6 illustrates how such failures can be linked into the model of human information processing, as well as
their relationship to the THEA error analysis questions discussed in Section 7.2. Table 5 provides some examples
of cognitive failure.
                                                          
2 Note that the cycle can also begin with a perception of some condition in ‘the world’.
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Table 5 - Some examples of cognitive failure
Cyclic model
stage Cognitive failure type Example
Goals
Lost goal
Unachievable goal
Conflicting goals
In the case study, forgetting to return to engine 3 fire
‘cleanup’ actions. Fail to notice and act on a warning
(trigger).
Attempting to make an impossible aircraft course
change.
Conflict between goals to maintain thrust and shut down
engine.
Plans
Faulty or wrong plan
Impossible plan
Shutting down the wrong engine.
Plan involving the selection of a menu item that does not
exist.
Actions Action slip/lapse Forget action or sequencing. Fail to carry out actioncorrectly.
Perception /
Interpretation
Failure to perceive/mis-perception
Misinterpretation
Mis-read the current setting in the altitude alert window.
Read a display value and erroneously interpret the figure
as angle of descent instead of vertical speed.
In Section 8, we ask questions about the performance of each of the cognitive components in relation to the use
of the system to try and anticipate where cognitive failures might occur and result in behavioural errors.
6.2 Deviations from expected behaviour
Thus far, we have described a cognitive view of error, employing causal guidewords such as ‘lost’, ‘faulty’,
‘wrong’, ‘impossible’ and so on. Perhaps more familiar is the behavioural approach, where errors are described
in terms of deviations from some prescribed, or normal, course of action. A set of “keywords” captures classes of
behavioural deviation and are derived in the main from the nuclear power industry, and employed in techniques
such as HAZOP (Kletz, 1983):
¨ Omission – fail to carry out an action or the actions associated with a sub-goal
¨ Commission:
- Incorrect – carry out the correct action or sub-goal, but do so incorrectly
- Substitution – substitute an incorrect action or item of data for a correct one
- Insertion – insert an extraneous action into the stream of behaviour
¨ Sequence – perform the right action or sub-goals unnecessarily
¨ Quantitative – carry out a correct action, but with some ‘quantitative’ error (too much / too little / too long /
too short etc.).
6.3 Some problems
It is highly probable that such an enumerated set of terms is incomplete. Moreover, although the definitions may
appear unambiguous, this is not always the case. Figure 7, adapted from (Hollnagel, 1998) illustrates, for
example, the differing ways in which an action, required at a specific time, may be omitted:
Missing
Desired timing
Delayed
Premature
Substituted
The desired
action at the
required time
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Figure 7 - Four types of "omission" error
This illustrates that an error of commission (substituted action, bottom arrow), i.e. performing an unplanned or
unintended action, effectively precludes the required event taking place at the required time. Thus an error of
commission logically implies an omission also, since one cannot make a commission error without also making
an omission. Moreover, errors of commission are insufficiently constraining as a guide due to the large number of
substitutions possible. For example, while entering data into a flight computer, a pilot could:
§ Do something other than enter data;
§ Enter the data into a different device;
§ Enter, for example, a distance value instead of an altitude.
With these caveats in mind, we can now discuss the THEA error analysis which is framed around a set of
questions based on the human information processing model, and employing some of the terms just described.
7 Error Analysis
We now draw together the previous strands to provide an analysis technique that will help us assess a system’s
vulnerability to erroneous interaction. The approach poses questions in a structured and systematic way, based on
the failures suggested by the model of human information processing. In this way, it is easier to envisage ways in
which things might go wrong, leading to a failure in cognitive processing. Once a potential problem is identified,
it is possible to think about how that failure may be manifested in erroneous behaviour, as well as anticipating the
ultimate effects on the state of the entire system.
7.1 The error identification process
Error identification in THEA involves the user asking pertinent questions about a scenario in order to reveal
areas of interaction that may be problematic. We now detail a set of such questions used by THEA that assists the
process. This is a preliminary step in the process of identifying possible causal factors, tracing their effects
through to behavioural failures, and ultimately their impact on the task or system being controlled. Figure 8
illustrates such a process:
Figure 8 - Process for potential cognitive failure identification
Precisely how the analysis is carried out is largely dependent on the level of detail required. However, two
recommended methods are:
1) Follow the goal hierarchical task structure from top to bottom, asking the set of questions about each
goal or task, or
2) Select parts of the scenario where potential problems are anticipated, ask the question set for appropriate
tasks, then conduct a detailed analysis of behavioural error and impact.
The first option clearly affords the most thorough analysis and is recommended for new designs. For complex
designs, analysis will naturally be a lengthier process but is likely to uncover a greater number and range of
concerns. In some instances, there will clearly be potential for a cognitive failure but with no obvious behavioural
manifestations. A good example of this is where goals come into conflict. It is sometimes unclear what the
behavioural implications of a conflict will be, although the problem is still potentially serious, especially if the
goals involved are important or their resolution is complex. In such cases, the cognitive failure itself may be
regarded as the “problem” to which a design solution may be required.
Ask questions about
scenario actions to
raise issues
Identify possible causal
factors of potential
problems identified
Identify possible
consequences and
their impact on task,
work, user, system, etc.
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Analysis results can be recorded in a fairly ad hoc way, depending on the specific requirements of the project.
However, it has proven useful in practice to record the results in a tabular format such as the one illustrated in
Table 6.
Table 6 - A suggested format for recording error analysis results
Question Causal Issues Consequences Design
Issues
Identifier of
the question
(as an aid to
traceability).
Issues raised by the
analyst as a result of
asking the question
and obtaining an
undesirable result.
Consequences of the causal issue. These can take a
number of forms: cognitive failures or behavioural
errors whose likelihood may be increased; additional
cognitive or behavioural work that may be generated;
effects of the task and work; impact on the system
(particularly from a safety point of view).
Notes,
suggestions,
comments,
re-design
ideas.
The ‘Question’ column represents a ‘checklist for cognitive analysis’, guiding the analyst in a structured manner
through the questionnaire. The ‘Causal Issues’ column is provided as a means of recording an analyst’s thoughts
with regard to factors that are likely to influence an operator’s predisposition to commit errors. The
‘Consequences’ column is used to record the possible impact(s) that the identified causal issue might have on the
task itself, operator workload, system state, as well as any hazardous conditions that may result. Finally, “Design
Issues” provides space for documenting ideas about how the design might be amended to manage or remove the
identified problems.
7.2 Applying the cognitive error analysis (EA)
The questions in Table 7 are based on the failures that are possible in the execution-evaluation cycle model of
human information processing, as previously discussed in Section 6.1. Note that, for clarity, a ‘causal issues’
column has been omitted since this is only relevant while completing the questionnaire (for example, see the
completed questionnaire in Section 9).
Table 7 - THEA Error Analysis questionnaire for asking structured questions about a scenario
Questions Consequences Design Issues(where appropriate)
Goals, Triggering and initiation
G1. Are items triggered
by stimuli in the
interface,
environment, or
task?
If not, goals (and the tasks that achieve them) may be
lost, forgotten, or not activated, resulting in omission
errors.
Are triggers clear and
meaningful? Does the
user need to remember
all the goals?
G2. Does the user
interface “evoke”  or
“suggest” goals?
If not, goals may not be activated, resulting in omission
errors.
If the interface does “suggest”  goals, they may not
always be the right ones, resulting in the wrong goal
being addressed
E.g.: graphical display
of flight plan shows pre-
determined goals as
well as current progress.
G3. Do goals come into
conflict?
If so additional cognitive work (and possibly errors)
may result from resolving the conflict. If the conflict is
unresolvable, one or more goals may be lost,
abandoned, or only partially completed.
Can attempt to design
out conflicts or give
participants the
resources to resolve
them.
G4. Can a goal be
achieved without all
its “sub-goals” being
correctly achieved?
The sub-goals may be lost  (resulting in omissions).
E.g.: goal of
photocopying
achievable without sub-
goal of retrieving card.
Plans
P1. Can actions be
selected in-situ, or is
pre-planning
required?
If the correct action can only be taken by planning in
advance, then the cognitive work may be harder.
However, when possible, planning ahead often leads to
less error-prone behaviour and fewer blind alleys.
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P2. Are there well
practiced and pre-
determined plans?
If a plan isn’t well known or practiced then it may be
prone to being forgotten or remembered incorrectly. If
plans aren’t pre-determined, and must be constructed
by the user, then their success depends heavily on the
user possessing enough knowledge about their goals
and the interface to construct a plan.
If pre-determined plans do exist and are familiar, then
they might be followed inappropriately, not taking
account of the peculiarities of the current context.
P3. Are there plans or
actions that are
similar to one
another? Are some
used more often than
others?
A similar plan may be confused for the intended one,
resulting in the substitution of an entire task or sub-
task.
P4. Is there feedback to
allow the user to
determine that the
task is proceeding
successfully towards
the goal, and
according to plan (if
there is one)?
Insufficient feedback may result in the user becoming
confused about how the plan is progressing. Additional
undesirable or inappropriate actions may be performed
as a result of this lack of clear feedback.
Performing actions
A1. Is there physical or
mental difficulty in
executing the
actions?
Difficult, complex or fiddly actions are prone to being
carried out incorrectly.
A2. Are some actions
made unavailable at
certain times?
A3. Is the correct action
dependent on the
current mode?
Creates a demand on the user to know what the current
mode is, and how actions’ effects differ between
modes. Problems with this knowledge can manifest
themselves as a substitution of one logical action for
another.
A4. Are additional
actions required to
make the right
controls and
information available
at the right time?
The additional goals may be lost  (resulting in
omissions) and users will be unable to carry out the
main goals. The overall effect may be to cause
confusion and disorientation for the user.
Perception, Interpretation and evaluation
I1. Are changes to the
system resulting
from user action
clearly perceivable?
If there’s no feedback that an action has been taken, the
user may repeat actions, with potentially undesirable
effects.
I2. Are the effects of
user actions
perceivable
immediately?
If feedback is delayed, the user may become confused
about the system state, potentially leading to a
supplemental (perhaps inappropriate) action being
taken.
I3. Are changes to the
system arising from
autonomous system
action(s) clearly
perceivable by the
user?
A non-awareness of an autonomous system change, or
a misconception in the user’s mental model may result.
This could lead to a misassessment of, for example, the
current mode configuration, potentially resulting in
inappropriate user actions.
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I4. Are the effects of any
autonomous system
action(s) perceivable
immediately?
If feedback is delayed, the user may become confused
about the system state, potentially leading to a
supplemental (perhaps inappropriate) action being
taken.
I5. Does the item
involve monitoring,
vigilance, or
continuous
attention?
The user’s attention can easily be diverted away from
monitoring tasks, meaning that changes that confirm
goals achievement (leading to repetition of actions or
carrying out actions too late)  or that trigger new goals
may be missed (resulting in omission of the associated
actions).
I6. Can the user
determine relevant
information about
the state of the
system (from the
total information
provided?)
If not, the user will have to remember the information
they require, thus making it prone to being lost or
recalled incorrectly.
I7. Is complex
reasoning,
calculation or
decision making
involved?
If cognitive tasks are complex, they may be prone to
being carried out incorrectly, to being the cause of
other tasks carried out too late, or to being omitted
altogether.
I8. If interacting with a
moded system, is the
correct interpretation
dependent on the
current mode?
Creates a demand on the user to know what the current
mode is, and to how the appropriate interpretation of
information differs between modes. Problems with this
knowledge can manifest themselves as a substitution
of one logical information item for another.
8 Error analysis example
This section illustrates how an analysis might typically be carried out and is based on the case study detailed in
Section 2.4. For clarity, the example in Table 8 does not examine particular (low-level) operator/system tasks,
but instead demonstrates the general technique of questionnaire completion. By following the example, the
technique of performing detailed domain-specific THEA analyses for individual projects should become
apparent. The “Design Issues” column has been left intentionally blank since it is not really appropriate in this
high-level ‘overview’ example. For a less complex, but more detailed lower-level worked example, see Section 9.
Table 8 - Error analysis example for the bird-strike scenario
Question Causal issues Consequences Designissues
GOALS, TRIGGERING, INITIATION
G1
1. Many goals are triggered fairly directly via the
environment as well as the interface (e.g. presence
of engine smoke and interface fire warning).
2. Timing of lower level goals arises as a
combination of triggering and group decision
making (e.g., Engine 3 shutdown).
3. Some goals rely on general airmanship skills for
their activation (e.g., power, drag).
4. Some goals poorly triggered, especially if there
are several goals with only a single trigger on the
display (e.g., “Engine 4 shutdown” or  “Engine 3
cleanup”).
Main behavioural consequence (4)
is that triggers for cleanup actions
exist in the display, but are
removed when other tasks
intervene (switching to “Engine 4
shutdown” removes indications
for “Engine 3 cleanup”). It’s
possible that “Engine 4 shutdown”
or  “Engine 3 cleanup” might be
omitted or delayed.
G2
The presence of data within a dedicated warning
display ‘evokes’ or ‘suggests’ that action is
required to be taken
It is assumed that display will
have sufficient ‘attention
grabbers’ to alert crew.
G3 Goals to Increase power and Engine 3 shutdown Resolving the conflict
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are in conflict (although it is inevitable in this
scenario).
satisfactorily requires negotiation
between PF and PNF. The time
required for this negotiation may
lead to a non-optimal (too late)
decision.
G4 Unknown (see EAs for lower-level tasks) -
PLANS
P1
Most functional aspects of the tasks will be well
practiced and planned in advance. Less well
planned are interactions with the technology and
management of the various goals. E.g. Breaking off
from Engine 3 tasks to do engine 4 ones, and
resuming engine 3 tasks later.
1. At the level of actions, plan
following is well supported, but at
the level of goals (e.g. Engine 4
shutdown) prioritisation and
interleaving is not well practiced.
2. The fact that actions are well
planned may make prioritisation
more error prone.
P2
Interaction will tend to be a mixture of pre-planned
procedure following (how to shut down an engine)
and on the fly decision making (when to shut the
engine down).
See P1.
Because the time of shutdown
can’t be planned in advance, it is
prone to errors in on-the-fly
decision making.
P3 Engine 3 fire & engine 4 failure similar. Enginefire procedure is better practiced.
Actions from engine fire
procedure may be done on engine
4. But this is a superset of engine
failure actions.
P4 Unknown (see EAs for lower-level tasks) -
PERFORMING ACTIONS
A1 Work tasks not problematic, but interface tasks(e.g. checking off actions) are awkwardly located.
May omit, or repeat.
A2 Once a fire extinguisher shot has been used, it isno longer available.
Possible confusion and
substitution of shot 1 and shot 2
buttons may be significant.
A3 Retracting flaps below minimum manoeuvringspeed may stall aircraft.
Decision about when to retract
flaps is both necessary and critical.
A4
Additional task required to switch between
different warnings and check off actions  reducing
time available.
May omit.
PERCEPTION, INTERPRETATION & EVALUATION
I1
1. Work tasks provide good feedback (tactile,
auditory, visual).
2. Interaction tasks provide less direct feedback
(e.g. When a plan has been completed).
-
I2 In this scenario most action effects are perceivableimmediately. -
I3 Unknown (see EAs for lower-level tasks) -
I4 Unknown (see EAs for lower-level tasks) -
I5
In general no, but there are some requirements to
monitor intervals of time between actions (second
shot 30 seconds after the first one).
Distraction of other (high priority)
tasks during waiting period may
result in second shot being
delayed/omitted.
I6
Information relevant to the interaction tasks (as
opposed to work tasks) can only be determined if
user has checked off items etc.
-
I7 Possibly, although this should be minimised ifstandard operating procedures are adhered to
Assume crew adherence to SOPs.
I8 Unknown (see EAs for lower-level tasks) -
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9 A fully-worked THEA example
In this second worked example, we conduct a full EA on a single sub-task involved in the ‘root’ goal of
programming a domestic video recorder to record a weekly television programme. The scenario for this example
is listed in Table 9. It is not the intention to address specific interface difficulties, but rather to provide an
example which allows us to focus on the method itself through use of a domain with which most people are
familiar.
9.1 Scenario details
Table 9 - Scenario for setting the date when making a domestic VCR weekly recording
SCENARIO NAME: Programming a video recorder to make a weekly recording
ROOT GOAL: Record weekly TV programme
SCENARIO SUB-GOAL: Setting the recording date
ANALYST(S) name(s) & Date:  J. Smith / 14th March 2001
AGENTS
A single user interfacing with a domestic video cassette recorder (VCR) via a remote-control unit (RCU).
RATIONALE
The goal of programming this particular VCR is quite challenging. Successful programming is not certain.
SITUATION & ENVIRONMENT
A domestic user wishes to make a recording of a television programme which occurs on a particular channel at
the same time each week. The user is not very technologically aware and has not programmed this VCR
previously. A reference handbook is not available, but there is no time pressure to set the machine – recording is
not due to commence until tomorrow.
TASK CONTEXT
The user must perform the correct tasks to set the VCR to record a television programme on three consecutive
Monday evenings from 6pm-7pm on Channel 3 (see Figure 9). Today is Sunday.
SYSTEM CONTEXT
The user has a remote control unit containing navigation keys used in conjunction with programming the VCR as
well as normal VCR playback operation. The RCU has four scrolling buttons, indicating ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘up’,
‘down’. Other buttons relevant to programming are labelled ‘OK’, and ‘I’ (see Screenshot 1).
ACTIONS
The user is required to enter a recording date into the VCR via the RCU using the buttons listed above. The
actions appear in the order specified by the task decomposition see section 9.2.
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
There are no exceptional circumstances.
ASSUMPTIONS
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9.2 Task representation
A hierarchical task analysis (HTA) constructed for the scenario is shown in Figure 9, highlighting the sub-task
(“Enter Date”) that we are analysing. Note also the plan associated with the execution of the sub-tasks.
Screenshot 1 shows the actual screen the user is presented with at this particular stage.
Figure 9 - Video recorder HTA
Screenshot 1 shows the display presented to the user for the “Enter Date” step in the programming sequence:
Screenshot 1 - VCR screenshot awaiting date input
Table 10 shows the completed error analysis questionnaire using the format shown in Table 5 (a template is
provided in Appendix B – Blank error analysis template for personal use). It will be appreciated that this
represents the analyst’s subjective judgement since there are no right or wrong answers. Another analyst may well
provide different answers. It has been found useful on occasion for more than one person to complete the
questionnaire, especially if coming from different project areas. We have found, for example, that false
assumptions or misunderstandings are often picked up by discussion between analysts, thereby increasing the
validity of the answers.
1.
Record weekly TV
programme
1.2
Enter Date
1.3
Enter record
Start/Stop time
1.1
Enter
programme
number
1.4
Exit program
mode
1.2.1
Enter "Daily/
Weekly"
PLAN: 1.1-1.3 In Order (repeat as necessary), then 1.4, 1.5
1.5
Set vcr to
standby
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9.3 Error Analysis questionnaire
Table 10 - A completed error analysis questionnaire for the “Enter Date” task
SCENARIO NAME:   Programming a video recorder to make a weekly recording
TASK BEING ANALYSED:   Setting the recording date
ANALYST(S) NAME(S) & DATE:   J. Smith / 14th March 2001
Question Causal issues Consequences
Design issues
(where
appropriate)
GOALS, TRIGGERING, INITIATION
G1
(Is the task triggered by
stimuli in the interface,
environment, or the task
itself?)
Yes. (The presence of an
“Enter Date” prompt is
likely to trigger the user
to input the date at this
point).
- -
G2
(Does the UI “evoke” or
“suggest” goals?)
N/A. (The UI does not,
per se, strictly evoke or
suggest the goal of
entering the date).
- -
G3
(Do goals come into
conflict?)
There are no discernible
goal conflicts. - -
G4
(Can the goal be satisfied
without all its sub-goals
being achieved?)
NO. The associated sub-
goal on this page of
setting the
DAILY/WEEKLY function
may be overlooked. Once
the date is entered,
pressing the right cursor
key on the RCU will enter
the next “ENTER HOUR”
setting.
Failure to set the
DAILY/WEEKLY option.
Once the ENTER HOUR
screen is entered, the
DAILY/WEEKLY option
is no longer available.
Suggest addition
of an interlock so
that the
Daily/Weekly
option cannot be
bypassed.
PLANS
P1
(Can actions be selected
in-situ, or is pre-planning
required?)
True. (Entering the date
can be done ‘on-the-fly’.
No planning is required).
- -
P2
(Are there well practiced
and pre-determined
plans?)
N/A. (A pre-determined
plan, as such, does not
exist, but the user should
possess enough knowledge
to know what to do at this
step).
- -
P3
(Are there plans or actions
that are similar? Are some
used more often than
others?)
There are no similar or
more frequently used
plans or actions
associated with this task.
- -
P4 Yes. (As the user enters Task is proceeding (See A1).
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(Is there feedback to allow
the user to determine that
task is proceeding
successfully towards the
goal, and according to
plan?)
digits into the date field
via the RCU, they are
echoed back on-screen).
satisfactorily towards
the goal of setting the
date (although the date
being entered is not
necessarily correct).
PERFORMING ACTIONS
A1
(Is there physical or
mental difficulty in
performing the task?)
YES. The absence of any
cues for how to enter the
correct date format
makes this task harder to
perform.
The user may try to
enter the year or month
instead of the day.
Additionally, the user
may try to add a single
figure date, instead of
preceding the digit with
a zero.
Have a explanatory
text box under the
field or, better
still, default
today’s date in the
date field.
A2
(Are some actions made
unavailable at certain
times?)
No. (The only actions
required of the user is to
enter two digits in the
blank field).
- -
A3
(Is the correct action
dependent on the current
mode?)
No. (The operator is
operating in a single
(programming) mode).
- -
A4
(Are additional actions
required to make the right
controls and information
available at the right
time?)
YES. The date field is
presented blank. If the
user does not know the
date for recording (or
today’s date), the user
must know to press the
‘down’ cursor key on the
RCU to make today’s date
visible.
The user may be unable
to enter the date, or
the date must be
obtained from an
external source. Also, if
the user presses either
the ‘left’ or ‘right’
cursor key, the ‘ENTER
DATE’ screen is exited.
1. Default current
date into date
field;
2. Prevent user
from exiting
‘ENTER DATE’
screen before an
entry is made (e.g.
software lock-in).
PERCEPTION, INTERPRETATION & EVALUATION
I1
(Are changes to the system
resulting from user action
clearly perceivable?)
Yes. (Via on-screen
changes to the date
field).
- -
I2
(Are the effects of such
user actions perceivable
immediately?)
Yes. (Digit echoing of
RCU key presses is
immediate).
- -
I3
(Are changes to the system
resulting from autonomous
system action(s) clearly
perceivable?)
N/A. (The VCR performs
no autonomous actions). - -
I4
(Are the effects of such
autonomous system
action(s) perceivable
immediately?)
N/A. (As I3). - -
I5
(Does the task involve
monitoring, vigilance, or
spells of continuous
attention?)
No. (There is no
monitoring or continuous
attention requirements on
the user).
- -
I6 NO. User cannot If user doesn’t know As A1.
26
(Can the user determine
relevant information about
the state of the system from
the total information
provided?)
determine current date
without knowing about
the ‘down’ cursor key.
Also, if date of recording
is known, user may not
know about the need to
enter two digits.
today’s date, and only
knows that, say,
Wednesday, is when you
want the recordings to
commence, then user is
stuck.
I7
(Is complex reasoning,
calculation, or decision-
making involved?)
No. - -
I8
(If the user is interfacing
with a moded system, is the
correct interpretation
dependent on the current
mode?)
N/A.
(It is not considered
likely that the date
field will be confused
with another entry field
(e.g. ‘Hour’).
-
9.4 Examining the results and conclusions
When EAs have been performed for each goal/sub-goal in the hierarchical task structure, the questionnaires are
examined and each potentially problematic area noted. This can be performed, say, by highlighting each
‘negative’ (potentially problematic) response on every completed questionnaire sheet (the grey cells in Table 10).
Another useful exercise is to colour code each according to severity by, for example, using a green highlighter to
mark a potential problem but of low consequence, and medium-/high-consequence ones with yellow and orange,
say. When collated, these problems should be examined closely, plus any interrelationships and their possible
implications noted and assessed. Interpreting the results should be undertaken with great care and design
modifications considered as the preferred option for intractable difficulties. THEA and ProtoTHEA greatly
facilitate the process of obtaining the appropriate results for examination.
For the video programming example, it is possible to identify certain problematic areas:
1. The goal of entering the date can be achieved without the sub-goal of setting the ‘daily/weekly’ function,
which could result in only a single recording, instead of multiple recordings, being made;
2. The user could encounter problems in entering the date in the correct format, since there are no on-screen
guides as to how this should be done, leading to confusion and potential disorientation;
3. The interface makes unwarranted assumptions about the user knowing specific remote control unit functions
which are far from intuitive. The “Enter Date” screen can be unwittingly exited, or even ‘ejecting’ the user
from the programming environment completely. At best, this will delay setting the recorder and, at worst,
prevent the recorder from being correctly programmed, thereby losing the programme(s);
4. Essential data can only be obtained from the recorder with considerable difficulty and knowledge of remote
control input ‘code sequences’. Basic information is ‘hidden’ from the user when it needs to be defaulted on-
screen.
From such findings, user-centric design deficiencies can be established. If the design is still at an early stage of
development, changes should be made. All, or part, of the error assessment process should then be repeated (see
Figure 1).
ProtoTHEA tool support, as described briefly in Appendix A – Tool support with ProtoTHEA., works in exactly
the same way as the ‘manual’ method described above except that an output diagram, known as a “Problem state
profile chart”, is provided, summarising and weighting the severity of each potential concern identified.
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10 Appendix A – Tool support with ProtoTHEA.
When conducting larger and more complex case studies, a need was identified for tool support to assist with error
analysis. This resulted in the development (Johnson, 1999) of “ProtoTHEA” , a prototype tool where, in addition
to error analysis details, scenario and HTA information for each project is entered and stored via a graphical user
interface, with all data being stored in a user-transparent database. For each scenario, an output in the form of a
‘failure state profile’ is automatically created (see Screenshot 3). Such an output is intended to highlight areas of
the design which the error analyses have identified as potentially problematic. The tool also tracks analysis (and
any analyst) changes made during any design review and update sessions. This is considered vital for traceability
purposes, especially for large scale projects where personnel may change throughout the design lifecycle.
Screenshot 2 shows a partial error analysis for the video recorder case study discussed in Section 9. Question 10
checks that “There is no mental or physical difficulty in carrying out this task”. The analyst can answer ‘True’,
‘False (adding whether it is considered to be Low, Medium, or High severity)’, ‘TBD’ (to be decided, if no
decision has been reached on this question), or ‘N/A’ if the question is not applicable for the current task. Space
beneath each question allows for analysts’ comments to be inserted as before i.e. ‘Causal Issues’, ‘Consequences’
and ‘Design Issues’. This is strongly recommended.
Screenshot 2 - Extract of a completed ProtoTHEA Error Analysis questionnaire
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Screenshot 3 - A typical ProtoTHEA 'Problem State Profile' chart output3
Outputs such as  this afford a quick overview of potential problems, often by highlighting problem ‘clumps’. In
the screenshot, triggering and goals, plus certain actions, need further examination. Two questions concerning
perception also need to be investigated. As mentioned earlier, the questionnaire should be revisited and design
changes considered where necessary. The diagram may also help address, and raise issues, concerning more
generic design concerns e.g. “Our moding concept may need to be re-appraised”.
                                                          
3 Q1 - Q20 are exactly the same as G1-G4, P1-P4 etc. in the manual approach. Using consecutive numbers in
ProtoTHEA facilitates database data manipulation.
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
Severity Level:
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11 Appendix B – Blank error analysis template
SCENARIO NAME:
GOAL/SUB-GOAL BEING ANALYSED:
ANALYST NAME(S) + DATE:
THEA EA Question Causal Issues Consequences Design Issues (where
appropriate)
GOALS, TRIGGERING & INITIATION
G1
(Is the task triggered by stimuli
in the interface, the
environment, or by the nature of
the task itself?)
G2
(Does the user interface
“evoke” or “suggest” goals?)
G3
(Do goals come into conflict?)
G4
(Can a goal be achieved
without all its ‘sub-goals’ being
correctly achieved?)
PLANS
P1
(Can actions be selected in situ,
or is pre-planning required?)
P2
(Are there well practiced and
pre-determined plans?)
P3
(Are there plans or actions that
are similar to one another? Are
some used more often than
others?)
P4
(Can the user determine that
the task is proceeding
successfully towards the goal,
and according to plan (if there
is one)?)
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ACTIONS
A1
(Is there physical or mental
difficulty in executing the
actions?)
A2
(Are some actions made
unavailable at certain times?)
A3
(Is the correct action dependent
on the current mode?)
A4
(Are additional actions
required to make the right
controls and information
available at the right time?)
PERCEPTION, INTERPRETATION & EVALUATION
I1
(Are changes to the system
resulting from user action
clearly perceivable?)
I2
(Are the effects of such user
actions perceivable
immediately?)
I3
(Are changes to the system
resulting from autonomous
system action(s) clearly
perceivable by the user?)
I4
(Are the effects of such
autonomous system action(s)
perceivable immediately?)
I5
(Does the task involve
monitoring, vigilance, or spells
of continuous attention?)
I6
(Can the user determine
relevant information about the
state of the system from the
total information provided?)
I7
(Is complex reasoning,
calculation, or decision-making
involved?)
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I8
(If the user is interfacing with a
moded system, is the correct
interpretation dependent on the
current mode?)
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12 Appendix C – Examples of Error Analysis questions
G1: “Is the task triggered by stimuli in the interface, the environment, or by the nature of the task itself?”
Instrument triggering: A dial needle moves into a red ‘danger zone’ and a bell sounds to alert the user to
do something;
Environment triggering: Ice forming on an aircraft windshield elicits a response from the pilot to
activate windshield de-icing.
G2: “Does the user interface ‘evoke’ or ‘suggest’ goals?”
An aircraft primary flight display shows waypoints (i.e. pre-determined goals) graphically, as well as
current progress towards those goals.
G3: “Do goals come into conflict?”
A pilot of an aircraft flying at low altitude over the sea may suffer an engine fire (perhaps after suffering
a bird-strike), and is forced to choose between closing the engine down and extinguishing the fire, and
obtaining more thrust to remain above the sea.
G4: “Can a goal be achieved without all its ‘sub-goals’ being correctly achieved?”
True: Photocopying a sheet of paper (‘the goal’) can be achieved without first removing the original
copy (and possibly the photocopying card as well, for non-cash machines);
False: A cash teller machine will not allow removal of cash (‘the goal’) until the user’s bank card has
first been removed (‘the sub-goal’).
P1: “Can actions be selected ‘in-situ’, or is pre-planning required?”
Walking down to a local store can be accomplished without first deciding which route to take i.e. it can
be performed ‘in-situ’ or ‘on the fly’. However, one day you hear that the normal route is impassable.
Some form of advance planning will probably now be required.
P2:  “Are there well-practiced and pre-determined plans?”
A pilot uses a ‘normal’ checklist during each phase of flight, every flight, to ensure that actions which
must be completed for safe flight are actually performed. Similar use of an emergency checklist during
non-normal conditions ensures appropriate actions are taken to rectify the abnormality, as well as
helping to reduce mental workload on the pilot.
P3: “Are there plans or actions that are similar to one another? Are some performed more often than
others?”
Plan similarity: A maintenance engineer is using a checklist to replace a specialist nut from a bolt that
has corroded, but is erroneously using the checklist for nut removal from a normal bolt. Both checklists
are very similar to each other, except that the specialist nut replacement checklist contains some
important extra actions that must be carried out.
Plan frequency: A car driver uses their vehicle to drive to and from work each day. On one occasion,
however, the driver must alter slightly the return journey to pick up some groceries. It is quite possible
that the revised plan will be ‘overwritten’ by the more frequently conducted regular journey home and
the groceries will be forgotten (‘the task omitted’).
P4: “Is there feedback to allow the user to determine that the task is proceeding successfully towards the goal,
and according to plan (if there is one)?”
The global positioning system (GPS) on an aircraft flight deck alerts the pilot, both visually and audibly,
that a particular intended waypoint has been reached. The task of navigating towards some ultimate
waypoint is proceeding successfully and according to plan (via pre-set waypoints towards the final
destination).
A1: “Is there any physical or mental difficulty in executing the actions?”
A pilot is required to perform a ‘miles’ to ‘kilometres’ conversion during a high workload phase of
flight.
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A2: “Are some actions made unavailable to the user at certain times?”
A computer user creating a document in a word processor, clicks with the mouse on a drop-down menu
to access the ‘Print’ command. However, this command is ‘greyed out’ and is unavailable to the user.
Subsequent investigation reveals that the printer had previously been removed for servicing and had not
been reconnected. After plugging in and switching on, the same drop-down menu now indicates that the
‘Print’ command is available for use (i.e. it is not greyed-out).
A3: “Is the current action dependent on the current mode?”
A typical domestic clock-radio alarm requires the user to set each function (time/clock/alarm) separately
via specific button presses. Setting a radio channel, for example, requires the user to be in ‘radio’ mode
– if not, the user might unwittingly be altering the clock time.
A4: “Are additional actions required to make the right controls and information available at the right time?”
A mining engineer about to detonate an explosive charge must first insert and rotate an arming key in
the firing control interface. When done, a lamp illuminates indicating that the fire control button is
‘available’ i.e. live.
I1: “Are changes to the system resulting from user action clearly perceivable?”
True: Changing television channel
False: Fine tuning a television set for strongest signal/least noise
I2: “Are the effects of such user actions perceivable immediately?”
True: Turning up the volume control on a radio
False: Turning up a central heating thermostat on a cold day. The house will not feel warmer until after a
considerable delay.
I3: “Are changes to the system resulting from autonomous system action(s) clearly perceivable by the user?”
A computer user receives an email message and is notified of its arrival by a screen flash and a brief
sound.
I4: “Are the effects of such autonomous system action(s) perceivable immediately?”
A domestic central heating system switches itself on at a pre-programmed time. A change in the ambient
temperature will not, however, be noticed until some time later.
I5: “Does the task involve monitoring, vigilance, or spells of continuous attention?”
Measuring out a specific weight of a recipe ingredient requires continuous monitoring of the dial on the
weighing scales. If attention is distracted from this task, excess ingredient may be inadvertently added
which may go unnoticed and/or cause an overflow from the measuring bowl.
I6: “Can the user determine relevant system information about the state of the system from the total
information provided?”
A motorist determines from the dashboard fuel gauge that a refuelling stop is required as the needle
approaches ‘Empty’ and a low fuel warning lamp illuminates.
I7: “Is complex reasoning, calculation, or decision-making required?”
A motorist driving in a foreign country using a different distance and fuel measuring system must
perform a conversion calculation in order to judge distances and to put an appropriate quantity of fuel in
the tank. The fuel grades may also be labelled in a manner unfamiliar to the motorist, and careful
decision-making must be performed in order not to put the incorrect fuel into the vehicle with potential
for damaging the engine.
I8: “If the user is interfacing with a moded system, is the correct interpretation dependent on the current
mode?”
Input moding: Pressing the ‘Play’ button on a domestic hi-fi system might activate the CD player instead
of the desired cassette deck. Pressing ‘Play’ will activate only the device which is currently selected on
the front panel i.e. it is mode dependent;
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Output moding: The same hi-fi unit may also be indicating 00:37:22 in the display window, with the
rightmost (least significant) digits incrementing in second intervals. The user may assume that the CD
has been playing for 37m 22s when in fact the display is in ‘Clock’ mode, thus indicating that the time is
approaching twenty to one in the morning.
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13 Appendix D – Non-scenario-based evaluation approaches
In this report we have shown how scenarios can help us anticipate ways in which a system under design may be
used. Here we acknowledge that there are many other, more general, aspects of good interface design, but which
fall outside the scope of this report. However, we briefly discuss two of the most important when assessing a
design:
1. The ways in which superficial aspects of an interface may confuse a user;
2. The effects of restricting a user’s authority.
Confusion and complexity
Perhaps the simplest and most obvious way of anticipating sources of system induced error is to look for places
where an interface may be complex or may be a cause of confusion. A number of questions about a design can be
asked to help expose the potential for problems. If the answer to any of the questions is “yes”, then there may be
a problem with the interface under scrutiny.
§ Appearance – do displays or control panels look cluttered? Are displays arranged so as to
make the more important information and controls more difficult to find?
§ Complexity – are complex or awkward command sequences, manipulations of data, or
perceptual/mental operations necessary? Will users find it hard to understand or predict what
the effects of carrying out commands or actions will be? Do actions have complex side
effects?
§ Discriminability – are different controls made to look or feel the same? Are data that mean
different things displayed in visually indistinguishable ways?
§ Consistency – are similar tasks carried out in different ways? Are similar data displayed in
different formats using several forms of representation?
§ Affordance – does the appearance of controls obscure their function and method of
activation? Does the representation of data fail to make apparent the ways in which they can
be manipulated?
Authority limiting
Another highly relevant aspect of a system’s behaviour when considering interaction error is the way in which
constraints are imposed on what an operator is able to do to the system. Limiting a user’s authority to a “safe” or
“acceptable” influence is often incorporated within a design to prevent or reduce the likelihood of particular
errors. For example:
§ Lock-ins – prevent actions from being omitted from a sequence, or keeping an operation
active, preventing someone from terminating it prematurely (example: cannot remove money
from a cash point machine without first removing bank card).
§ Lock-outs – prevent events from occurring (example: a barrier to the basement of a building
from the ground floor, so in an emergency people are prevented from attempting to exit at the
wrong level).
§ Interlocks – prevent certain sequences of actions being carried out or certain states from being
reached i.e. they force operations to take place in proper sequence (example: a microwave
oven door which disconnects power if opened during operation. The pin on a fire extinguisher
to prevent accidental use of the device).
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§ Guards – make certain high-consequence actions harder to perform or make them involve a
number of sub-actions (example: physically guarding important switches, or a ‘confirm’ box
on making a ‘file deletion’ selection.
§ Protections – allow the human to carry out actions but limit the effect they can have on the
controlled process (example: an aircraft flight control system can provide protection against
stalling, over speed, and so on).
37
Bibliography
Dix, A., Finlay, J., Abowd, G. and Beale, R. (1998) Human-Computer Interaction, Prentice Hall.
Fields, B., Harrison, M. and Wright, P. (1997) THEA: Human Error Analysis for Requirements
Definition. Technical Report (YCS294), University of York.
Hollnagel, E. (1998) Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method CREAM, Elsevier Science.
Johnson, P. (1999) A Tool for Human Error Assessment. M.Sc. Project. Department of Computer
Science, University of York.
Kirwan, B. (1994) A guide to practical human reliability assessment. Taylor and Francis.
Kletz, T. A. (1983) Hazop and Hazan - Notes on the Identification and Assessment of Hazards.
Institution of Chemical Engineers.
Kyng, M. (1995) Creating Contexts for Design. In Scenario-Based Design: Envisioning Work and
Technology in System Development (Ed, Carroll, J. M.) Wiley, pp. 85-107.
Loer, K., Harrison, M. and Wright, P. (1999) Checking Mode Complexity and Other Properties in
Interactive Systems. DCSC Technical Report. University of York.
Norman, D. A. (1988) The psychology of everyday things, Basic Books.
Woods, D. D., Johannesen, L. J., Cook, R. I. and Sarter, N. B. (1994) Behind Human Error: Cognitive
Systems, Computers, and Hindsight. SOAR CSERIAC 94-01.
All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.
